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jesse cross

“Done in Convention”: The Attestation Clause and
the Declaration of Independence
abstract. This Note offers a response to commentators who have argued that the Attestation
Clause is best read as a straightforward attempt by the Founders to import the spirit and values
of the Declaration of Independence into the Constitution. This argument distorts the
Constitution more than it illuminates it, for this argument obscures the fact that the Attestation
Clause reached out to a large set of domestic and international documents. In so doing, the
Clause offered important assurances of continuity and cooperation in a time of national
transformation, giving the Clause a distinctive spirit that only emerges when we read it in
dialogue with the legal instruments and practices of the time. Such a contextual reading reveals
that, while the Declaration signaled a dramatic break from the past, the Constitution’s
Attestation Clause conveyed a much more nuanced and far less radical set of signals.

author. Yale Law School, J.D. 2011; University of California, Irvine, M.A. 2006; Dartmouth
College, B.A. 2004. I particularly wish to thank Professor Akhil Reed Amar, whose teaching and
scholarship inspired this Note. I am grateful that this Note has given me the chance to learn
from such a brilliant scholar and devoted teacher. I also am thankful to Will Moccia and to the
rest of the staff of The Yale Law Journal for the helpful guidance and feedback they have provided
throughout the editorial process.
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introduction
At the close of the Constitution approved by the Constitutional Convention
in 1787, there is a short clause indicating the date on which and the location
where the Constitution was concluded and signed. Known as the Attestation
Clause, it recorded the date of the Constitution’s completion—and it did so in a
fashion that has drawn increasing attention from lawyers and scholars over the
past several decades.1 In addition to dating the Constitution according to the
year of grace (or the “Year of our Lord”), the Attestation Clause declares our
nation’s great founding document to have been executed “in the Year . . . of the
Independance of the United States of America the Twelfth.”2 Alluding to the
drafting of the Declaration of Independence eleven years earlier, the Attestation
Clause thus seems to establish a specific textual connection between the
Constitution and the Declaration. The Founders went out of their way to insert
the Declaration of Independence into this clause of the Constitution, it seems,
encouraging us to read these two documents as engaged in unique dialogue
with each other.
This is the argument that a variety of commentators have advanced, at
least. It is an argument that has been made by several scholars, such as one
who surmises, “No other conclusion logically can be reached since the
Constitution directly attaches itself to the Declaration of Independence in
Article VII . . . .”3 It is an argument that has been advanced in the pages of this
Journal, where it has been said that the reference to the Declaration reveals the
Federalists’ “efforts to highlight the [Constitution’s] ties to the American

1.

2.
3.

The full Attestation Clause reads,
done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States present the
Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of our Lord one thousand seven
hundred and Eighty seven and of the Independance of the United States of
America the Twelfth In witness whereof We have hereunto subscribed our Names
U.S. CONST. art. VII, cl. 2. The word “done” is rendered in larger print than are the words
surrounding it; “In witness” is also rendered in larger print, though not quite as large as that
used for “done.” In both instances, the words are printed in bold, stylized block letters as
opposed to the cursive that dominates the rest of the text. Unless otherwise noted, all
references to the Constitution refer to the parchment version, an image of which is available
at Constitution of the United States, NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/
constitution_zoom_4.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2012).
U.S. CONST. art. VII, cl. 2.
David Barton, A Death-Struggle Between Two Civilizations, 13 REGENT U. L. REV. 297, 312
(2001); see also Harry V. Jaffa, Graglia’s Quarrel with God: Atheism and Nihilism Masquerading
as Constitutional Argument, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 715, 728-29 (1995) (arguing that the
reference to the Declaration is evidence that the Founders intended to incorporate the
Declaration into the Constitution).
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Revolution.”4 It is a point that has been argued to the Supreme Court as
recently as 2008, when it was suggested to the Court that the Attestation
Clause “legally engrafts the Declaration of Independence into the Constitution
as effectively as though it had said, ‘attached hereto and made a part hereof.’”5
Even one current Justice has advanced a version of this argument, with Justice
Thomas writing in the pages of the Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy
that “[o]ne should never lose sight of the fact that the last words of the original
Constitution as written refer to the Declaration of Independence, written just
eleven years earlier.”6
These commentators have tried to transform the Attestation Clause into a
textual foundation for the idea that, as the Supreme Court put it in 1897, “it is
always safe to read the letter of the Constitution in the spirit of the Declaration
of Independence.”7 They have argued, in other words, that it is permissible to
read the Constitution in the “spirit of the Declaration” because the Attestation
Clause’s reference to the Declaration specifically imports that spirit into the
Constitution. By making this argument, however, they have presumed that it is
“safe” to read a reference to the Declaration as evidence of the Founders’ intent
to import the spirit of that revolutionary document into the Constitution. In
this Note, I attempt to show that it is not “safe” to do so. I hope to show that
the Attestation Clause in fact was animated by its own, distinct spirit—a spirit
that was in some ways contrary to that found in the Declaration.
In this Note, therefore, I will suggest that the argument advanced by
Justice Thomas and others distorts the Constitution more than it illuminates it.
Theirs is a misleading argument, I will contend, because it concludes from the
plain language of the Attestation Clause that the Founders understood the
Declaration to be the central text with which their Constitution was in
dialogue. This argument obscures the fact that the Attestation Clause reached
out to a large set of domestic and international documents, including the
Articles of Confederation and a wealth of English treaties and charters. When
we restore what would have been the eighteenth-century vision of the
Attestation Clause, we can see that the Attestation Clause is defined by its

4.
5.
6.
7.

Michael Coenen, Note, The Significance of Signatures: Why the Framers Signed the Constitution
and What They Meant by Doing So, 119 YALE L.J. 966, 999 (2010).
Brief for Faith and Action et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 17-18, Pleasant
Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009) (No. 07-665), 2008 WL 2550617, at *17-18.
Clarence Thomas, The Higher Law Background of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 63, 65 (1989).
Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 160 (1897). Many of the commentators
who cite the Attestation Clause as grounds for a connection between the Constitution and
the Declaration quote this passage from Ellis. See, e.g., Barton, supra note 3, at 312.
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connections to a variety of domestic and international documents, the least of
which is the Declaration of Independence.
The Attestation Clause’s very act of appropriating language from these
domestic and foreign documents reveals a set of values and commitments at
work in the Clause—values that are distinct from (if not outright antithetical
to) those found in the Declaration. The Attestation Clause’s connections to
these various legal documents reveal that the Clause is a relatively conservative
portion of the Constitution, emphasizing continuity not only with the regime
of the Articles of Confederation, but also with a variety of centuries-old English
diplomatic practices. Placed in historical context, the Attestation Clause thus
reminds us that the Founders were not one-dimensional revolutionaries
continually reiterating the themes of rebellion and independence, but rather
skilled politicians able to conjure assurances of continuity even in times of clear
crisis and transformation.8 In this sense, the Attestation Clause evinces a
purpose very different from the one that animated the self-consciously
revolutionary text of the Declaration of Independence, a text focused on
“dissolv[ing] the political bands which ha[d] connected” colonial Americans to
their prior sovereign.9

8.

9.

In this sense, my Note intersects with broader discussions about the extent to which the
Constitution was intended to be read as a self-consciously revolutionary document. Bruce
Ackerman has famously argued that the Constitution of 1787 was strategically designed to
highlight its break with preexisting law—that is to say, with the Articles of Confederation.
See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 173-75 (1991). In resorting to a
“convention” that was associated with illegality and that proudly defied the rules of
amendment set out in the Articles of Confederation, Ackerman argues, the Founders were
highlighting their own illegality. Id. In so doing, the Founders were allegedly signaling to
the nation an effort at “higher lawmaking” that spoke directly for the People in a way that
government-as-usual never could. Id. at 165-86.
Sanford Levinson and Jack Balkin have similarly described the drafting of the
Constitution as a crisis that “require[d] political leaders to admit publicly (and perhaps even
proudly) that they [were] going outside the law to preserve the country.” Sanford Levinson
& Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Crises, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 707, 724, 727 (2009). Levinson and
Balkin find this to be a rare moment in American history, as American leaders in subsequent
constitutional crises resorted to secrecy and clever argumentation to defend the
constitutionality of their actions, rather than brazenly embracing the illegality of their acts.
Id. at 721-29. Levinson and Balkin thus see the Founders’ proud embrace of illegality as the
exception rather than the rule in moments of great American constitutional crisis or change.
See id. They seem to agree with Ackerman, however, that the Founders were clearly and
explicitly highlighting their act of constitutional composition as a rejection and a defiance of
the Articles of Confederation and the political regime that the Articles had inaugurated. See
id. at 727-29.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). The purpose of the Declaration of
Independence was not simply to embrace revolution and upheaval as values in their own
right, of course. The Declaration sought to articulate a set of values that justified the
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In order to develop this argument, it will be necessary to show that the
Attestation Clause drew upon prior legal documents and diplomatic practices
in ways that would have emphasized continuity with past exercises of
sovereignty as well as compatibility with international practices of diplomacy.
The majority of this Note, therefore, will be focused on revealing the legal
instruments and international customs that lay behind the verbiage of the
Attestation Clause and that already were well established in England and
America. Cobbled out of phrases and formulations found in English treaties,
charters, and compacts, the Attestation Clause’s component parts all would
have been familiar to a person living in the eighteenth century and well versed
in diplomatic practices. The resulting Clause would have looked laden with
forms inherited from earlier British and American practice, and the way that
these forms were deployed would have suggested the importation of a set of
values distinct from those associated with the Declaration.
Since different phrases in the Attestation Clause drew upon different legal
instruments and diplomatic customs, the subsequent analysis addresses the
Clause’s various phrases separately, showing how each relevant phrase in the
Attestation Clause was built upon a set of practices that would have imbued the
phrase with meaning and value. Each of the first three Parts of this Note
therefore begins by connecting a relevant phrase from the Attestation Clause to
the practices upon which it drew, and each Part concludes by discussing the
lessons to be gleaned from this historical context. Part I brings this analytic
approach to the Attestation Clause’s labeling of the Constitution as “done in
Convention,” tracing this phrase’s journey from its early use in English treaties
and letters of credence, through its use in the Articles of Confederation and in a
number of documents emerging from the early Continental Congress, and
finally to its use in the Constitution. Part II explains the historical practice of
regnal dating, a practice that dates back at least to Roman times and that
underlay the dating of the Constitution “in the Year . . . of the Independance of
the United States of America the Twelfth.” Part III explains the longstanding
practice of drafters and ratifiers setting their names to documents such as
treaties and charters in order to witness the execution of these documents. Part

colonists’ act of rebellion, and it is this set of justificatory values to which Justice Thomas
and others generally wish to direct our attention. See, e.g., infra notes 90-93 and
accompanying text (discussing Justice Thomas’s interpretation of the “higher law”
principles to be found in the Declaration). Nonetheless, because the colonists believed that
revolution was necessary in order to realize that set of values, they crafted a Declaration that
understandably evinced little interest in maintaining a spirit of continuity with past regimes
or a spirit of cooperation with the international community. By contrast, I will argue, these
were the defining features of the Attestation Clause—features that we overlook when we
presume the Declaration to be the relevant text animating this portion of the Constitution.
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IV then steps back and reflects on the implications of the textual and historical
observations presented in the first three Parts. Through this analysis, I hope to
show that each phrase in the Attestation Clause would have conjured
associations with the Articles of Confederation and with English legal
documents, and that in so doing these phrases all invested the Attestation
Clause with a complex but coherent spirit—one that was very different from
the “spirit of the Declaration of Independence.”
i. done deal
“done in Convention”
– U.S. Constitution, Art. VII10
“Done in Congress at Philadelphia”
– Resolution of Congress, 177911
“Done at Westminster”
– Treaty of Peace and Alliance Between England and Denmark, 165412
The beginning of the Attestation Clause places the preceding Constitution
in context, explaining where, when, and by whom the document was
produced. In so doing, the Clause provides closure to the document; its past
tense use of “done” announces the close of the great deed begun in the
Preamble. This term “done” was given a prominent position in the text—in the
version of the Constitution signed by the members of the Constitutional
Convention, it began a new line and was rendered in larger type than was the
surrounding text, allowing it to stand out.13 In the printed version of the
Constitution (which was likely seen by the Convention’s delegates and by the

10.
11.
12.

13.

U.S. CONST. art. VII, cl. 2.
13 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 62 (Worthington Chauncey Ford
ed., 1909).
Treaty of Peace and Alliance, Den.-Eng., Sept. 15, 1654, reprinted in 1 A COLLECTION OF
TREATIES BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND OTHER POWERS 65, 73 (George Chalmers ed.,
London 1790). The original treaty was printed in Latin and uses the phrase “Actum
Westmonasterii.” 3 Consol. T.S. 357, 364.
U.S. CONST. art. VII, cl. 2. The version of the Constitution engrossed by Jacob Shallus was
the version that was signed by the members of the Convention. Denys P. Myers, History of
the Printed Archetype of the United States of America, 11 GREEN BAG 2D 217, 220-21 (2008),
available at http://www.greenbag.org/v11n2/v11n2_myers.pdf.
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states’ ratification committees14), the term was also highly visible, as it was one
of only ten words prior to the list of states accompanying the signatures to be
printed in all capital letters.15
In attaching to the Constitution a clause that declared where the composing
of the document was “done,” the members of the Convention were drawing
upon an established English practice regarding diplomatic correspondences
and treaties. This practice was described in a late eighteenth-century treatise on
the customs of European international law.16 In its analysis of “letters of
Council,” that treatise explained that, after the substance of the letter, “[t]hen
follows, separated from the body of the letter, the date, mentioning the place,
the day, the month, the year, and the reign.”17
Throughout the late 1770s, those in the Continental Congress were
engaged in an ongoing process of bringing their actions into accord with this
common diplomatic practice, routinely concluding letters of credence with a
separate “done in [location]” or “done at [location]” phrase that was
accompanied by the document’s date. As early as September 28, 1776, there are
records of letters of credence from the Congress to foreign leaders that
conclude with these “done” phrasings. The first such letter, which was
officially dated September 30, was typical; its final paragraph opens with the
phrase “Done in Congress, at Philadelphia.”18 While the fledgling Congress did
not have extensive opportunities to engage in diplomatic correspondences, it
had approved at least five letters of credence with identical or extremely similar
phrasings by the time signatures were first affixed to the Articles of

14.
15.

16.

17.
18.

Akhil Reed Amar, Our Forgotten Constitution: A Bicentennial Comment, 97 YALE L.J. 281, 28384 (1987).
The others were “We” in the Preamble, “All” in Article I, and “Article” in each of the seven
article titles. The September 28, 1787, print of the Constitution is reproduced in a 1961
Senate Document. See S. DOC. NO. 87-49, at 1-18 (1961). In addition, the term
“Constitution” was printed in small capitals in the Preamble, and each of the state names
accompanying the signatures was printed in all capital letters. See id.
[GEORG FRIEDRICH VON] MARTENS, SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS, FOUNDED ON THE
TREATIES AND CUSTOMS OF THE MODERN NATIONS OF EUROPE; WITH A LIST OF THE
PRINCIPAL TREATIES, CONCLUDED SINCE THE YEAR 1748 DOWN TO THE PRESENT TIME,
INDICATING THE WORKS IN WHICH THEY ARE TO BE FOUND 190 (William Cobbett trans.,
Philadelphia, Thomas Bradford 1795).
Id. at 190.
5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, supra note 11, at 833 (Worthington
Chauncey Ford ed., 1906). The claim that this represents “the first such letter” is based on
my own examination of the relevant documents.
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Confederation in July 1778.19 Clearly, the Congress was establishing a standard
practice regarding the affixation of this verbiage to diplomatic letters.
This practice of affixing a clause separated from the main text in order to
identify the place at which a diplomatic deed was “done” extended beyond
correspondences. Throughout the eighteenth century, such a clause was
invariably attached to treaties signed by England. A good example was the
treaty that ended the French and Indian War, the Treaty of Paris of 1763, which
concluded with the line, “Done at Paris the tenth day of February, 1763.”20
While the precise phrasing of such a concluding line was not always uniform,
the “done at [location]” formula certainly was the standard format for
eighteenth-century English treaties.
We know that at least some prominent members of the Second Continental
Congress were diligent in their efforts to master these English forms and
translate them into an American context. A good example is John Adams, who
drafted what has since been labeled “the Model Treaty,” which was designed to
be a guide for Americans conducting foreign relations. Describing Adams’s
approach in designing the Model Treaty, one scholar says:
In the preparation of his draft, [Adams] utilized three printed
compilations of English treaties and commercial laws, one a volume
lent him by Franklin containing the trade agreements concluded
between France and England in 1713 following what Americans called
Queen Anne’s War. Primarily, Adams relied on these references to
assure the proper—or, at least, the customary European—form of treaty
provisions.21
While the Model Treaty did not include a specific model for attestation clauses,
it does speak to both deference to European international forms and diligence
in making sure they were followed (and, indeed, by way of example, the treaty
Adams concluded with the Netherlands in 1782 did bear a traditional “done at”
attestation22). This type of diligence surely would have brought an augmented
awareness of European forms to the Continental Congress, increasing

19.

20.
21.
22.

See 5 id. at 833; 8 id. at 519, 522 n.1, 523 n.1 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1907); 11 id. at
547 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1908). The only differences among the relevant
phrases are the locations named, reflecting the Congress’s relocations among Philadelphia,
Baltimore, and Yorktown.
Definitive Treaty of Peace, Fr.-Gr. Brit.-Spain, Feb. 10, 1763, 42 Consol. T.S. 320, 334.
JOHN FERLING, JOHN ADAMS: A LIFE 189 (1992).
24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, supra note 11, at 78 (Gaillard Hunt
ed., 1922).
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familiarity with these forms and making their adoption in other realms of
lawmaking all the more likely.
It is clear that the European practice of concluding treaties with the “done
at [location]” verbiage was a practice that had been adopted in America by
1787. Twenty years after it signed the treaty ending the French and Indian War,
for example, England found itself signing another Treaty of Paris, this time in
order to end the War of American Independence. That treaty would similarly
conclude, “Done at Paris, this third day of September in the year of our Lord
one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three.”23 By this time, the involvement
of the British was not needed in order to assure the affixation of such a clause.
The 1776 Treaty of Amity and Commerce between America and France had
concluded, “Done at Paris, this sixth day of February, one thousand seven
hundred and seventy-eight.”24 The Treaty of Alliance with France, signed the
same day, bore the same concluding phrase.25 Notably, when Congress ratified
these two treaties with France, it also appointed a three-person committee “to
prepare the form of ratification” of the treaties; two of the committee members
were Richard Henry Lee and Francis Dana.26 These two men would become
Gouverneur Morris’s coauthors for the attestation clause of the Articles of
Confederation. The “form of ratification” Lee and Dana presented on May 5,
1778, read:
Done in Congress at York town, in the state of Pennsylvania, this
4th day of May, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred
and seventy eight.
In testimony whereof, the President, by order of the said Congress,
hath hereunto subscribed his name and affixed his seal.27
This practice had also spilled over to at least one state constitution in the
years prior to the drafting of the attestation clause for the Articles of
Confederation. The Georgia state constitution of 1777 was the only state
constitution in existence that similarly employed the phrase “done,” as its
attestation clause began, “Done at Savannah, in convention . . . .”28 Regardless

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Definitive Treaty of Peace, art. X, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80.
Treaty of Amity and Commerce, art. XXXI, U.S.-Fr., Feb. 6, 1778, 8 Stat. 12.
Treaty of Alliance, art. XIII, U.S.-Fr., Feb. 6, 1778, 8 Stat. 6.
11 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, supra note 11, at 458.
11 id. at 463.
GA. CONST. of 1777, reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 377, 383 (Ben: Perley Poore
ed., Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2001) (2d ed. 1878) [hereinafter COLONIAL CHARTERS].
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of whether any specific causal connections exist between the state constitution
and the congressional documents that bore the same phrase, the use of this
language in the Georgia constitution highlights the fact that this linguistic
formulation was in circulation in America in the late 1770s.
When Gouverneur Morris, Richard Henry Lee, and Francis Dana were
assigned to draft an attestation clause for the Articles of Confederation,29
therefore, they had the option of drawing upon a common international
diplomatic practice that the Continental Congress had assumed as its own by
July 1778. Moreover, they had already once seen this practice translated into a
constitutional document at the state level. Drawing upon this traditional
approach to attestation, the authors opened their attestation clause by declaring
the Articles “Done at Philadelphia in the state of Pennsylvania.”30
While we know that Morris, Lee, and Dana were together assigned to
author the attestation clause for the Articles, incidentally, it is unclear who
authored the relevant “done at” phrase. The draft of the attestation clause that
Morris and his coauthors presented to the Continental Congress on June 26
was very similar to the language of the enacted Articles, but it was not
identical. When the Articles were signed on July 9, 1778, one sentence was
deleted from the paragraph preceding the attestation clause, and the specific
dates were written into the spaces that Morris and his fellow drafters had by
necessity left blank.31 Between the June 26 draft and the completion of the
Articles, only one other set of substantive changes would be made to the
language presented by Morris and his coauthors, and its origins are not clear.
The attestation clause proposed on June 26 read, “In witness whereof, we have
hereunto set our hands, this [blank] day of [blank] in the year of our Lord
1778, and in the [blank] year of the independence of the United States of
America.”32 In the final version, by contrast, the first sentence of the attestation
clause would read, “In Witness whereof we have hereunto set our hands in
Congress,” while the remainder would state, “Done at Philadelphia in the state
of Pennsylvania the ninth Day of July in the Year of our Lord one Thousand
seven Hundred and Seventy-eight, and in the third year of the independence of
America.”33 The clause was divided in two, in other words, and a geographic

29.

30.
31.
32.
33.

See 11 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, supra note 11, at 656 (“Resolved,
That a committee of three be appointed to prepare the form of a ratification of the articles of
confederation: The members chosen, Mr. R[ichard] H[enry] Lee, Mr. G[ouverneur]
Morris, and Mr. [Francis] Dana.”).
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. XIII, para. 2.
11 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, supra note 11, at 677.
11 id. at 658.
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. XIII, para. 2.
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identifier, “Done at Philadelphia in the state of Pennsylvania,” was added as the
opening phrase of the final clause.
In the nine years that would intervene between the signing of the Articles
and the drafting of the Constitution, this practice would only be further
entrenched in the Continental Congress, as attestation clauses bearing the
“done in/at” structure would continue to be affixed to correspondences and
treaties conducted by the Congress.34 And when Gouverneur Morris in
September of 1787 was again assigned the task of drafting an attestation clause
(this time without the assistance of coauthors),35 he produced a clause
extremely similar to that which had been used for the Articles. Indeed, the
parallels between the attestation clauses of the Constitution and the Articles of
Confederation are striking. Only seven extant state constitutions had full
attestation clauses;36 both the Articles and the Constitution had them. Only
one state constitution then in existence (Georgia’s) listed the date of signing
both in the year of grace and in years since the signing of the Declaration;37
both the Articles and the Constitution did so. None of the existing state
constitutions was signed “In witness whereof”; both the Articles and the
Constitution bore this phrasing. And only one state constitution (Georgia’s
again, as discussed above38) employed the word “done”; both the Articles and
the Constitution did so.39

34.
35.

36.
37.
38.
39.

See, e.g., Definitive Treaty of Peace, supra note 23; 14 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 1774-1789, supra note 11, at 658 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1909).
The notes for Monday, September 17, 1787, explain that “[t]his ambiguous form [of the
Attestation Clause] had been drawn up by Mr. G. M. . . . and put into the hands of Docr.
Franklin that it might have the better chance of success.” 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 643 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS].
See sources cited infra note 83.
GA. CONST. of 1777, reprinted in 1 COLONIAL CHARTERS, supra note 28, at 377, 383.
See supra text accompanying note 28.
The influence of state constitutions is more notable, incidentally, in the Constitution’s use
of “in Convention” as a sort of geographic marker. Five state constitutions executed between
1776 and 1787 similarly asserted that they had been passed “in convention” or “in
Convention.” GA. CONST. of 1777, reprinted in 1 COLONIAL CHARTERS, supra note 28, at 377,
383; MD. CONST. of 1776, reprinted in 1 COLONIAL CHARTERS, supra note 28, at 817, 820;
N.H. CONST. of 1784, reprinted in 2 COLONIAL CHARTERS, supra note 28, at 1280, 1293; N.Y.
CONST. of 1777, reprinted in 2 COLONIAL CHARTERS, supra note 28, at 1328, 1328; PA. CONST.
of 1776, reprinted in 2 COLONIAL CHARTERS, supra note 28, at 1540, 1548. A sixth state
constitution was done “By order of Convention.” VT. CONST. of 1786, reprinted in
2 COLONIAL CHARTERS, supra note 28, at 1866, 1875. The Articles of Confederation, by
contrast, only noted that they were “Done at Philadelphia in the state of Pennsylvania.”
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. XIII, para. 2. For a discussion of the significance
of the “convention” in American constitutionalism, see ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 173-75.
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The language of these two attestation clauses is too similar to be
coincidental, particularly in light of Gouverneur Morris’s involvement in
drafting both of them. Granted, Morris was only one of three coauthors of the
attestation clause for the Articles, and the language proposed for the Articles
was altered before it became final. Yet this does not change the fact that Morris
had a particular reason to be aware of the attestation language in the Articles
and to have tracked its development with special attention. It seems likely that
this experience would have informed his act of authorship the second time
around, and the text of the Attestation Clause bears out this hypothesis.
Regardless of Morris’s specific sources of inspiration, however, it seems
clear that the bold “done” that concluded the Constitution reached back
historically to eighteenth-century practices of international law. The idea of
having a separate clause that opens by identifying the location at which the
document was composed, and which offers this location in the specific form of
“done at [location]” or “done in [location],” is simply too great an overlap with
past practice to be a coincidence. Moreover, the continuation of this practice in
the Continental Congress, including but not limited to the Articles of
Confederation, provides a clear bridge that connects its use in the Constitution
to its use in the treaties and diplomatic correspondences of eighteenth-century
England.
The Attestation Clause’s phrase “done in Convention” thus reaches back to
the Articles of Confederation, a founding document that itself reflected
Congress’s broad adoption of the rhetoric of international law. From these
facts, we can draw some preliminary conclusions about the ways in which the
Clause would have been understood by contemporary readers. First, we must
recall that Morris was instructed to write the Attestation Clause such that it
would garner votes from members of the Constitutional Convention.40 Fortyfour of the Constitutional Convention’s delegates had served in the
Continental Congress.41 An Attestation Clause that made the Constitution
resemble a body of documents already approved by the Congress would likely
make the Constitution look more familiar to the delegates, enhancing the
likelihood that they would sign. Similarly, echoes both of the Articles of
Confederation and of prior documents of the Congress would perhaps
emphasize to the larger public that this was a document to be understood as
analogous to, rather than in contravention of, the Articles of Confederation and

40.
41.

See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 35, at 643.
DONALD S. LUTZ, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 12 n.10 (1988).
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the government established by those Articles.42 In these senses, the “done
in/at” phrasing likely would have emphasized continuity with the regime that
the new Constitution was to replace, implicitly assuring two different (though
overlapping) interpretive communities that this new Constitution did not
constitute a violent departure from the preceding regime.
Moreover, the “done in/at” phrasing likely signaled to an international
audience that, while this Constitution ushered in a new era of popular
sovereignty, it did not change the nation’s intent to conform to international
practices and norms. It must be recalled that it was as yet unknown how the
United States would conduct itself as a member of the international
community; America was a new nation operating out of a novel understanding
of the relation between sovereign and subject.43 The inclusion of rhetoric such
as the “done in/at” formulation signaled that this new nation was aware of the
basic practices of the international community and intended to abide by them.
Thus, if the Declaration was focused on “dissolv[ing] the political bands” that
connected the states to England as colonies,44 the Attestation Clause seems to
suggest an interest in preserving the diplomatic bands that connected the
United States to England (and other nations) as a member of the global
community.
In all of these senses, the opening phrase of the Attestation Clause offers an
important qualification to the idea that the Attestation Clause serves to import
the “spirit of the Declaration of Independence” into the Constitution. When
the Attestation Clause is reduced to its reference to the Declaration of
Independence, we lose sight of the complex ways in which the Founders were
simultaneously reassuring the nation that this new Constitution was an
intelligible continuation of life under the Articles. Moreover, an exclusive focus
on the connection to the Declaration ignores the fact that the Attestation
Clause provided subtle reassurances to the international community in ways
that the Declaration did not. In both of these senses, the Attestation Clause
does indeed manifest a distinctive spirit, but it is a spirit that differs in
interesting and important ways from that found in the Declaration.

42.
43.
44.

This is not meant to suggest that the Constitution necessarily was in contravention of the
Articles; this potential objection, whether correct or not, might still have been anticipated.
For a discussion of the novelty of America’s experiment with popular sovereignty, see AKHIL
REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 5-21 (2005).
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
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ii. double date
“the Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of our Lord one thousand
seven hundred and Eighty seven and of the Independance of the United States
of America the Twelfth”
– U.S. Constitution, Art. VII45
“the sixth day of August, Anno Domini, 1680, and in the two and thirtieth
year of the reign of King Charles the Second”
– Duke of York’s Grant for the Soil and Government of West New Jersey,
168046
The Attestation Clause gives the date on which the Constitution was
signed, and it does so in two forms, listing the year in the year of grace (or the
“Year of our Lord”) as well as in the year “of the Independance of the United
States of America.”47 This dual dating strategy was nothing new at the time it
was incorporated into the Constitution; providing parallel dates was an ancient
dating practice with which many were already familiar in the late 1700s. As the
late C. R. Cheney, a professor of medieval history at Cambridge, describes it:
From ancient up to modern times it has been a common practice to
date official documents by the year of the rulers or magistrates from
whom the documents emanated or within whose jurisdiction they were
issued. Roman law demanded that certain classes of documents should
bear the names of the consuls for the year; and, in the absence of exact
information, dating by reference to past consuls was sometimes
preferred . . . . In A.D. 537 Justinian provided that the years of the
emperor’s reign should be added and thereafter the post-consulatum
element, though it lingered on in various forms, ceased to be of
practical importance. But the system which had been used by the
consuls of the Roman people and the emperors was copied by popes,
bishops, kings, dukes, and lesser men. . . . Sometimes the regnal year

45.
46.

47.

U.S. CONST. art. VII, cl. 2.
Duke of York’s Second Grant to William Penn, Gawn Lawry, Nicholas Lucas, John
Eldridge, Edmund Warner, and Edward Byllynge, for the Soil and Government of West
New Jersey (Aug. 6, 1680), reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS
COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND
COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2560, 2560
(Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS].
U.S. CONST. art. VII, cl. 2.
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was used to the exclusion of the indiction or year of grace, sometimes it
accompanied these elements.48
Cheney thus describes a longstanding practice of dating documents by
reference to the year in which an overseeing sovereign had come to power, and
he explains that this regnal year was, in many instances, accompanied by the
year of grace. Notably, the regnal dating system was often used in English
charters, as Cheney explains:
The regnal year is used in Anglo-Saxon royal charters early in the
eighth century . . . . From 1189 onwards it has been the approved
method of expressing the year-date in documents of the civil
government in England. Moreover, English private charters, which
until Edward I’s reign are usually undated, thereafter record the regnal
year as a matter of course.49
An examination of the English commissions and charters for the Americas
shows that this practice of regnal dating was alive and well in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries and that it was common to give the regnal year
alongside the year of grace.50 This practice is particularly relevant because, as
Donald Lutz has put it, “When Americans finally brought all the elements
together in single documents in 1776, these constitutions derived their
elements from . . . charters . . . .”51
Indeed, it would be surprising if the Founders did not turn to these
documents. As Lutz points out, the Founders were trying to find ways to craft
documents that would control “the placement of sovereignty, the definition of
a regime, the distribution of power among offices and institutions, and some
definition of limits on governmental power. During the colonial era, external
documents—the charters, patents, and ordinances written in England for the

48.
49.
50.

51.

HANDBOOK OF DATES FOR STUDENTS OF ENGLISH HISTORY 3 (C. R. Cheney ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1995) (1945).
Id. at 12.
See, e.g., Commission to Sir Ferdinando Gorges as Governor of New England by Charles
(July 23, 1637), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/charter_009.asp; Grant
of His Interest in New Hampshire by Sir Ferdinando Gorges to Captain John Mason (Sept.
17, 1635), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/charter_008.asp; The Act of
Surrender of the Great Charter of New England to His Majesty (June 7, 1635) [hereinafter
Act of Surrender], reprinted in 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 46, at 1860,
1861; Grant of the Province of New Hampshire to Mr. Mason, 22 Aprill, 1635, by the Name
of Masonia, reprinted in 4 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 46, at 2441, 2443.
LUTZ, supra note 41, at 22.
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colonists—dealt with those constitutional functions.”52 Lutz thoroughly details
how, as one would expect, the Founders did draw upon the rhetoric and
content of preceding English charters. In fact, he points out, in Massachusetts,
Connecticut, and Rhode Island, “each state’s colonial charter . . . served as the
initial state constitution in 1776.”53 Rather than seeing charters as outdated
documents that needed to be wholly discarded, many members of the founding
generation apparently saw them as models and templates upon which to build.
It makes some sense, therefore, that they would conclude founding documents
such as the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution with the dual dating
system that they were used to seeing not only on a broad variety of legal
documents, but specifically on the charters that often served as their templates.
The widespread acceptance of this dating practice in postrevolutionary
America is particularly evinced by the variety of important American
documents that had already incorporated it by the time the Articles of
Confederation were drafted in 1778. The Georgia state constitution had
employed the practice in 1777,54 and at least one declaration by the Continental
Congress had already utilized it as well.55 A scholarly debate in the late 1800s
over the possible existence of a Mecklenburg Declaration of Independence also
catalogued the fact that this dating practice was well established in wills and
deeds in 1777 and 1778, at least in North Carolina. As Alexander Graham and
George Graham put it in 1895:
Some of these deeds are dated “in the reign of King George the III.”
Patriots with strong local pride calculated “Our Independence” from
the Mecklenburg Declaration, and others reckoned “American
Independence” from July 4th, 1776. Deeds of the first sort are not to be
found of a later date than 1777, but “Our Independence” and “American
Independence” were both employed for computation . . . . Some of the
deeds . . . read as follows:
“This indenture made this 13th day of February, 1779, and in the 4th
year of our independence.” . . .

52.
53.
54.

55.
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Id. at 35.
Id. at 49.
The Georgia Constitution was dated “the fifth day of February, in the year of our Lord one
thousand seven hundred and seventy-seven, and in the first year of the Independence of the
United States of America.” GA. CONST. of 1777, reprinted in 1 COLONIAL CHARTERS, supra
note 28, at 377, 383.
11 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, supra note 11, at 774 (“Done in
Congress, at Philadelphia, this 11 day of August, in the year of our Lord 1778, and in the
third year of the independence of America.”).

“done in convention”

“This indenture made this 28th day of January, in the fifth year of
our independence and the year of our Lord Christ 1780.” . . .
“This indenture made on the 19th day of May and in the year of our
Lord 1783 and the eighth year of our independence.”56
While the actual existence of a Mecklenburg Declaration has been vigorously
disputed,57 the evidence mustered in the course of this debate reflects the
ongoing practice of dual dating. Indeed, its use in North Carolina is confirmed
by the credentials of appointment that the state’s delegates presented to the
Continental Congress on June 2, 1777, which were dated “the 4th day of May,
Anno Domini, 1777, and in the first year of the independence of this state.”58
When Morris and his coauthors included this form of dating in the Articles of
Confederation, therefore, they were utilizing a dating practice that had already
taken firm root in various parts of the fledgling nation.
The Articles of Confederation further entrenched this dating practice. The
Articles themselves were dated “the ninth Day of July in the Year of our Lord
one Thousand seven Hundred and Seventy eight, and in the third year of the
independence of America.”59 Unlike the phrase “done in Convention,” which
was not in the original draft of the attestation clause for the Articles, this
parallel dating system was included in the draft submitted by Morris and his
coauthors to the Continental Congress on June 26, 1778.60 This only seems to
enhance the likelihood that Morris was drawing on his experience with the
Articles when he included a dual date in the Constitution.
When Morris did return to this dating device in September 1787, he did so
against the backdrop of its continued use by the Congress in the years since he
had drafted the clause for the Articles. Indeed, this dating practice continued to
be employed by the Continental Congress in the late 1770s and early 1780s on
declarations,61 instructions to consuls,62 and letters of credence.63 To a

56.

57.

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

GEORGE W. GRAHAM & ALEXANDER GRAHAM, WHY NORTH CAROLINIANS BELIEVE IN THE
MECKLENBURG DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE OF MAY 20TH, 1775, at 21-22 (Charlotte,
Queen City Printing & Paper Co., 2d ed. 1895) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
See MERRILL D. PETERSON, THE JEFFERSON IMAGE IN THE AMERICAN MIND 140-44 (1960)
(explaining the history of this dispute before concluding that the historical evidence does
not support the existence of a Mecklenburg Declaration).
8 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, supra note 11, at 411.
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. XIII, para. 2.
11 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, supra note 11, at 658.
See, e.g., 11 id. at 774.
See, e.g., 18 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, supra note 11, at 1136
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).
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Constitutional Convention comprised largely of former members of the
Continental Congress, this parallel dating system in all likelihood would have
recalled documents that many of the Convention’s attendees had approved in
the course of their prior lawmaking duties. The dating of the Constitution thus
seems, once again, to suggest that the Attestation Clause was sending the
Convention’s attendees a more complex and ambivalent set of signals than
simply a reminder or reiteration of the values found in the Declaration of
Independence.
In fact, an awareness of the historical practice of parallel dating with regnal
years complicates in several ways the basic idea that a date referencing “the
Independance of the United States” is best understood as an attempt to link the
Constitution to the Declaration of Independence. To those familiar with the
Articles of Confederation, the dating method of the Attestation Clause equally
would have suggested a connection to the governing document that the
Constitution was replacing, echoing the Articles’ language and structure and
perhaps allaying fears that the new Constitution might be in violation of,
rather than in the tradition of, the Articles. In this sense, emphasizing the
connection to the Declaration while excluding mention of the precedent found
in the Articles distorts by highlighting only the revolutionary aspects of the
Attestation Clause.64
The broader tradition of regnal dating upon which the Attestation Clause
drew offers the same lesson. Regardless of specific connections to the Articles,
the Clause’s use of regnal dating more generally undercuts the idea that giving
the date in years since “the Independance of the United States of America” was
a patriotic reminder of the nation’s break with England. No doubt this
language did in fact remind its readers that a far-off king no longer marked
their time. Yet if the content of this dating system emphasized the nation’s
rupture with royal power, the form in which the date was given emphasized
continuity, echoing not only the Articles but an ancient practice—and, closer to
their own time, a British practice—of acknowledging the rule under which one
lived. In a Constitution proposing a radical form of popular sovereignty, in

63.
64.

See, e.g., 18 id. at 1188.
It could be argued, of course, that the Articles themselves had incorporated the Declaration
of Independence and that the linkage of the Constitution to the Articles therefore produces
no tension with the idea of a Constitution that incorporates the Declaration. As I explain,
however, the attestation clause of the Articles of Confederation contains many of the same
features found in the Attestation Clause of the Constitution—the very features that counsel
against reading the Constitution as having incorporated the Declaration. This fact seems to
counsel against the idea that the Articles incorporated the Declaration through their
attestation clause, and I am not aware of any other arguments for such an incorporation.
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other words, the regnal form of dating placed this novel sovereign within a
traditional frame. It drew upon the legitimacy that readers were used to
bestowing upon legal documents marked in regnal time. And it implicitly
assured the reader that this new nation, even with its unique temporal marker
of “Independance,” could be understood as analogous to nations grounded in
more familiar forms of sovereign authority. At the most, this was a
conventional way of being unconventional—an ambivalent assertion of
continuity as well as of independence. Justice Thomas and others miss this
more nuanced aspect of the Clause when they reduce it simply to a reminder of
the Declaration.
While the emphasis that Justice Thomas and others have placed on the
connection to the Declaration of Independence might be misleading, it is also
understandable. The appropriation of an old form to new purposes often has
unintended consequences, and the form of dual dating was no exception. The
application of this dating practice in the American context destroyed a certain
symmetry that dual dating had acquired under British practice. This symmetry
can be observed particularly well in the 1635 Act of Surrender of the Great
Charter of New England to His Majesty, which is dated “the seventh day of
June in the eleventh year of the reign of our Sovereign Lord King Charles, and in
the year of our Lord God, One thousand six hundred and thirty-five.”65 Here,
Christian theology conspired with monarchical theory to create symmetry in
the text. A “Sovereign Lord” below was matched with a divine Lord above.
This parallelism would be lost when regnal dating was transposed into a
country that defined itself not by reference to a King’s reign, but in relation to
an assertion of independence. The loss of this textual parallelism has combined
with our contemporary unfamiliarity with regnal dating to make the
Constitution’s dual dating look like a salient oddity—that is, like a formulation
that calls attention to itself because of its unnaturalness. In the eighteenth
century, by contrast, it likely would have harkened and alluded to a dating
practice that was considered perfectly natural and common. If the dual date on
the Constitution drew attention to itself in the 1700s, in other words, it would
not have done so merely as a reminder of the nation’s newfound political
independence. Rather, it also would have served to remind the reader of the
nation’s lingering dependence on English forms.

65.

Act of Surrender, supra note 50, at 1861 (emphasis added).
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iii. bearing witness
“In witness whereof We have hereunto subscribed our Names”
– U.S. Constitution, Art. VII66
“IN WITNESS whereof we have hereunto subscribed our names”
– Mayflower Compact, 162067
“In Witness whereof, We have caused these Our Letters to be made Patents.”
– Charter of Connecticut, 166268
Under English (and early American) practice, a variety of binding
documents were signed “In witness whereof.” In each instance, the signatories
who were signing as witnesses were the individuals invested with the legal
power to conduct the transactions described in those documents. Covenants,
compacts, and charters—three types of eighteenth-century documents that the
scholar Donald Lutz has identified as crucial precedents to the Constitution69—
all typically contained acts of witnessing that were denoted by the documents
being signed “In witness whereof.” Treaties were also typically signed “In
witness whereof,” a fact that likely was known to many of the delegates to the
Constitutional Convention, given the number of delegates who had served in
the Continental Congress in the preceding years.70
At the same time, however, there were important differences in the ways
that covenants and compacts employed the “witnessing” phrase, on the one
hand, and the ways that treaties and charters employed them, on the other
hand. The covenants and compacts of early colonial America were documents
that served a specific function: their purpose, in large part, was to garner (and
to document) the assent of a group of individuals who were uniting to form a
new political community. Covenants and compacts served primarily to forge a
group of individuals into a “civil Body Politick,” in the words of the Mayflower
Compact.71 Each covenant or compact was a ceremony whereby individuals
combined themselves into a new entity and submitted themselves to the rules

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

U.S. CONST. art. VII, cl. 2.
Agreement Between the Settlers at New Plymouth (1620) [hereinafter Mayflower
Compact], reprinted in 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 46, at 1841, 1841.
Charter of Connecticut (1662), reprinted in 1 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
46, at 529, 536.
LUTZ, supra note 41.
See text accompanying note 41.
Mayflower Compact, supra note 67, at 1841.
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of that entity. The Mayflower Compact therefore adopted the voice of a
collective community, proclaiming, “We . . . Do by these Presents, solemnly
and mutually, in the Presence of God and one another, covenant and combine
ourselves together into a civil Body Politick, for our better Ordering and
Preservation, and Furtherance of the Ends aforesaid . . . .”72
Covenants and compacts such as the Mayflower Compact thus spoke on
behalf of a collection of individuals who were ostensibly uniting in their
mutual agreement to form a single political community. This meant that
covenants and compacts dealt with matters that required the separate assent of
each member of the community. Because documents were commonly
witnessed by all the legal actors necessary to the document’s execution,
covenants and compacts would require each of these persons to sign the
document and to attest to his or her (though rarely “her”) individual consent.
They would require, in other words, far more acts (and signatures) witnessing
the document’s execution than were needed simply to attest to the validity of
the document.
Consequently, we see an abundance of witness signatures when we look
back on the compacts and charters of colonial America. Since the forging of
colonial communities required the individual assent of all the members of
those communities, early American covenants and compacts often were
witnessed by large numbers of people. A good example of this is seen in “The
Combination of the Inhabitants upon the Piscataqua River for Government,” a
1641 covenant that proclaims that the “Inhabitants upon the River of
Piscataqua have voluntar[il]y agreed to combine ourselves into a body Politick”
and that concludes by declaring, “In witness whereof Wee have hereunto set
our hands . . . .”73 This statement is followed by three signatures and the phrase
“with 38 more,”74 a large number that provides evidence that the inhabitants
who agreed to combine into a “body Politick” and the “Wee” who
“witness[ed]” this collective act were one and the same group of individuals.
This practice of witnessing, as it was used in covenants and compacts, may
help explain the rhetoric of another portion of the Constitution: its great
Preamble. Exposure to covenants and compacts would have meant that the
Founders were familiar with documents that opened, as did the Mayflower
Compact, in the voice of a “We” who spoke on behalf of the entire community
that was being combined into a single political unit. In this sense, early

72.
73.
74.

Id.
The Combination of the Inhabitants upon the Piscataqua River for Government (1641),
reprinted in 4 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 46, at 2445, 2445.
Id.
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covenants and compacts may have provided part of the backdrop and
inspiration for the Preamble’s bold willingness to speak on behalf of “We the
People.”
The act of witness found in the Attestation Clause does not resemble the
practice of witnessing found in the nation’s early compacts and covenants,
however, as much as it resembles the practice of witnessing seen in the various
treaties and charters that England issued throughout the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries. Treaties and charters, as documents executed by a king or
queen (or by those specifically given power by the king or queen), often were
signed by a “we” much smaller than the community that was bound by the
document. If there was a power structure in place that gave one person formal
authority to act unilaterally on a matter (such as the authority of a king or
queen to execute a charter), the document might only bear an attesting
signature plus the signature or seal of the person with formal authority over
the matter. A good example of this is found in the Charter of Carolina from
March 24, 1663. Done “Per Ipsum Regem,”75 the power to issue this charter
rested entirely with the King. Consequently, even though the Charter of
Carolina would help govern a large community of individuals, the attestation
on the charter begins with only one witness. It declares, “Witness the King, at
Westminster, the four and twentieth day of March, in the fifteenth year of our
reign . . . .”76
The conventions of treaties and charters therefore would have made it seem
natural and commonplace for the Constitution—a document that its authors
hoped would govern and bind a national populace—to end with an act of
witnessing accomplished only by the thirty-nine individuals who “subscribed
[their] Names” to the Constitution.77 By signing the Constitution “In witness
whereof,” the drafters of the Attestation Clause drew upon a centuries-old
tradition whereby a small number of politically significant actors would
witness the creation of a new political arrangement or alignment.
Unlike the kings and queens who witnessed English treaties and charters,
however, the signatories at Philadelphia were not witnessing the Constitution
in pursuance of any actual authority that had vested in them. They had no
power to bind the populace to whom they spoke and for whom they claimed to
speak. After all, the Constitution was not, at the time the Attestation Clause
was attached, an institutionally recognized or validated exercise of authority. It

75.
76.
77.

Charter of Carolina (1663), reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 46,
at 2743, 2753.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. VII, cl. 2.
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was a mere proposal, and a novel one at that. It was proposing a bold new
definition of sovereign authority, not simply drawing upon a preexisting
wellspring of power, so there was no need for this legal boilerplate. Yet this
legalistic phrase was affixed to the Constitution. Why would this be?
Part of the answer grows out of the account of the Constitutional
Convention found in Madison’s notes, where he points to the strategy that
helped motivate the inclusion of an attestation clause in the Constitution in the
first place. According to the notes, the Attestation Clause was drafted
specifically so as to maximize the number of signatures that could be garnered
from among the Convention’s delegates.78 It therefore would make sense to
have the Convention’s delegates sign “In witness” of the act of completing the
Constitution, for this would obscure the fact that not all signatories wanted to
vouch for the Constitution’s contents. This portion of the Attestation Clause
appears to have been written to ensure that, technically, the signatories were
merely witnessing the fact of the Constitution’s composition rather than
displaying their individual support for the document.79

78.
79.

2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 35, at 643.
Michael Coenen has provided a thorough and lucid account of this narrative. Coenen, supra
note 4. When considering the Constitution’s signatures in relation to the signatures on
documents such as the Articles of Confederation or extant state constitutions, Coenen
suggests that the relevant question is whether the Founders “wished to follow in the
tradition of these documents.” Id. at 982. Coenen defines the “tradition” of such documents
as including elements such as the timing and process of such signings, leading him to see a
contrast between the Constitution and the Articles of Confederation. As Coenen puts it:
In short, had the Constitution’s signers—many of whom had been involved
in the creation of the Articles and/or their respective state constitutions—wished
to follow in the tradition of these documents, they would not have signed their
names to the document on September 17, 1787. Rather, they would have waited
for the ratification process, during which representatives of the ratifying states
could have affixed signatures connoting legal validity, and perhaps also pledges to
abide by the Constitution. But the delegates at Philadelphia did not take this
route, which indicates that their decision to sign was driven by something other
than tradition-based impulses.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Coenen confines his analysis to the signatures themselves, so his analysis never needs to
grapple with the fact that the Constitution’s signatures, while affixed via the traditional
process by which signatures were affixed to the Articles, were nonetheless presented to
readers in nearly identical terms as were the Articles’ signatures. This raises a question that
is beyond the scope of Coenen’s analysis: why would the Founders mimic the language of
the Articles of Confederation even when their actions did not parallel those undertaken with
regard to the Articles? The most plausible answer, I suggest, is that regardless of the manner
in which the Founders signed the Constitution, their mimicking of the language of the
Articles would create textual parallels that would make a strange document seem more
familiar and that would make an extralegal Convention’s proposal seem more legitimate. In
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At the same time, Gouverneur Morris did choose to accomplish his
assigned task through the use of legal boilerplate that echoed a variety of other
legal documents and that thereby suggested that the Constitution already
carried some legal weight. The Constitution still had to be approved both by
the Convention and by the larger public before it could become law, after all.
By conjuring and alluding to familiar forms of exercising sovereign authority
(namely, treaties and charters), the act of witnessing implicitly assured its
various audiences (in the Convention, in the broader ratification debates, and
in the global community) that this Constitution fit within familiar notions of
sovereignty and carried the authority associated with those notions. In part
because it was signed “In witness whereof,” the Constitution looked analogous
to prior exercises of sovereign power. It sounded like law. And this may well
have helped it become law.
In this sense, the signatures on the Constitution may have struck
contemporary readers as being more closely linked to the signatures on treaties
and charters than to the signatures on the Declaration. In a fascinating note in
this Journal, Michael Coenen has suggested that the signatures on the
Constitution were meant to provide “visual cues to suggest continuity with the
Revolutionary cause.”80 Yet in the Attestation Clause, the use of the phrase “In
witness whereof” reveals an extralegal body using legal rhetoric to position its
signatories as though they were acting on behalf of extant legal authority. Such
an approach most likely would have reminded readers of those who actually did
sign similar documents in pursuance of their legal authority. The Declaration
was not such a document; in fact, it was in some ways the opposite of such a
document. By signing the Declaration, after all, the Founders clearly were
positioning themselves as proud outlaws. The composition of the Declaration
amounted to an act of treason that was punishable by death. The signatures on
the Declaration constituted a refusal to hide behind a veil of authorial
anonymity, bringing to light the identities of a band of revolutionaries unafraid
to stand behind their treasonous act.81 The Declaration was documentation of
an illegal action, in other words, and its signatures correspondingly positioned
its signatories as bravely defiant of the law.

80.
81.

this sense, when one includes the Attestation Clause within the scope of one’s analysis of the
Constitution’s signatures, the similarities to the Articles are what become most salient and
most interesting.
Coenen, supra note 4, at 999-1000.
For an excellent explication of this aspect of the Declaration’s signatures, an explication to
which my own analysis is indebted, see AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN
CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY (forthcoming 2012)
(manuscript at 310-11) (on file with author).

1260

“done in convention”

By contrast, the rhetoric of witnessing in the Attestation Clause—a rhetoric
absent from the Declaration—mimicked the signatures of those whose names
carried legal authority. The Constitution emerging from the Convention was a
proposal drafted by those invested with no legal authority of enactment, of
course, but its signatories chose to witness its composition as though both the
act of its completion and their personal acts of witnessing carried some
significance. The Attestation Clause thus placed the Constitution’s signatories
within a very different frame than did the Declaration, cloaking its signatories
in the rhetoric of legality rather than branding them as outlaws. The result was
likely that the act of witnessing found in the Attestation Clause echoed
documents beyond the Declaration alone, reminding readers of the attestations
found on treaties and charters, and perhaps bestowing the new Constitution
with the appearance of authority and legality that had cloaked those diplomatic
documents.
iv. implications
With each phrase of the Attestation Clause, therefore, the Clause’s authors
subtly gestured toward a long lineage of legal documents—a lineage that
reached from the Roman Republic all the way to the Continental Congress. For
audiences familiar with such legal documents, or at least familiar with the
eighteenth-century British and American iterations of them, this Attestation
Clause would have provided a familiar conclusion to an otherwise startlingly
novel document. With each phrase of the Attestation Clause, I have argued, we
can see the Clause’s drafters and ratifiers sending subtle messages of continuity
and reassurance to a variety of different audiences.
In advancing this argument, I do not pretend to be able to peer into the
minds of Gouverneur Morris and his fellow drafters in order to see whether
these messages were clearly and consciously intended, or whether these
messages merely had an intuitive appeal that was sufficient to warrant their
inclusion. Yet I do believe that the textual and historical materials mustered
here are sufficient to show that, at some level, Morris and the other drafters
intended the signaling functions that I have identified. In the absence of
definitive historical or biographical evidence to confirm this theory, however, it
is subject to the possible criticism that the Founders intended nothing at all by
the inclusion of these phrases in the Constitution. Is it possible that these
phrases were seen by the Founders to be mere hollow boilerplate? Is it possible
they intended nothing at all by the inclusion of these phrases?
This certainly is possible, and one must be careful not to overstate the level
of deliberation afforded to this Clause at the Convention. For several reasons,
however, I do not think that the boilerplate explanation of the Clause is the
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most likely explanation, and I do believe that we can perceive some level of
intent in the Founders’ addition of this Clause to the Constitution. First and
foremost is a reason already mentioned: these phrases were affixed pro forma
to specific types of legal documents because they served obvious, needed
purposes in those documents. With the Constitution, however, many of these
purposes vanished. To say that these phrases were affixed to the Constitution
as boilerplate is to say that the Founders failed to perceive this mismatch;
either the Founders did not understand the reasons why these phrases were
affixed to other documents, or they did not appreciate the novel characteristics
of their own Constitution. While both of these are possible, I suspect it is more
likely that the Founders felt such phrases served worthwhile rhetorical
purposes that warranted their inclusion independent of any legalistic functions.
The idea that these phrases were not seen as mere boilerplate is further
supported by the fact that attestation clauses were not affixed to constitutions
pro forma in early America. Five of the sixteen state constitutions written
between 1776 and 1787 had no attestation clause at all.82 Of the eleven that did
contain attestation language, seven had verbiage similar to that found in the
Attestation Clause,83 while four others had significantly shorter and less
thorough attestation clauses.84 Given this variation in state practice, it seems

82.

83.

84.

CONN. CONST. of 1776, reprinted in 1 COLONIAL CHARTERS, supra note 28, at 257; DEL.
CONST. of 1776, reprinted in 1 COLONIAL CHARTERS, supra note 28, at 273; MASS. CONST. of
1780, reprinted in 1 COLONIAL CHARTERS, supra note 28, at 956; VT. CONST. of 1777, reprinted
in 2 COLONIAL CHARTERS, supra note 28, at 1857; VA. CONST. of 1776, reprinted in 2 COLONIAL
CHARTERS, supra note 28, at 1910. For purposes of this analysis, I have labeled as having “no
attestation clause at all” any constitution lacking a clause that, at minimum, details the
location and date of the constitution’s execution in a grammatical phrase.
GA. CONST. of 1777, reprinted in 1 COLONIAL CHARTERS, supra note 28, at 377, 383; MD.
CONST. of 1776, reprinted in 1 COLONIAL CHARTERS, supra note 28, at 817, 820; N.H. CONST.
of 1784, reprinted in 2 COLONIAL CHARTERS, supra note 28, at 1280, 1293; N.J. CONST. of 1776,
reprinted in 2 COLONIAL CHARTERS, supra note 28, at 1310, 1314; N.Y. CONST. of 1777,
reprinted in 2 COLONIAL CHARTERS, supra note 28, at 1328, 1328; N.C. CONST. of 1776,
reprinted in 2 COLONIAL CHARTERS, supra note 28, at 1409, 1414; PA. CONST. of 1776, reprinted
in 2 COLONIAL CHARTERS, supra note 28, at 1540, 1548.
N.H. CONST. of 1776, reprinted in 2 COLONIAL CHARTERS, supra note 28, at 1279, 1279; S.C.
CONST. of 1778, reprinted in COLONIAL CHARTERS, supra note 28, at 1620, 1627; S.C. CONST.
of 1776, reprinted in 2 COLONIAL CHARTERS, supra note 28, at 1615, 1620; VT. CONST. of 1786,
reprinted in 2 COLONIAL CHARTERS, supra note 28, at 1866, 1875. I have labeled as
“significantly shorter and less thorough” those attestation clauses that consist only of the
location of attestation and of a date given in numerical form. I have labeled as clauses that
“had verbiage similar to that found in the Attestation Clause” those that add some language
or detail beyond the location and numerical date. This distinction, while admittedly
somewhat arbitrary, aims to capture the fact that the former approach to attestation is so
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insufficient to say that the Attestation Clause eluded scrutiny simply because it
was pro forma.
The idea that the Attestation Clause was not affixed pro forma is further
supported by the process by which it was attached to the Constitution—a
process that notably differed from that seen in the drafting of English charters,
which actually did have attestation clauses attached pro forma. When an
English charter was drafted, the attestation (or “testing”) clause was added at a
different time and was probably drafted by a different party than was the rest
of the charter. According to one authority:
The business of preparing the Bill, called the “King’s Bill,” for his
Majesty’s signature, [was] conducted in a permanent office called the
“Patent Bill Office,” or, more commonly, the “Patent Office”; of which
the chief officer, styled “Clerk of the Patents to the Attorney and
Solicitor General,” [was] appointed by those officials. The King’s Bill
contain[ed] the whole form and settled draft of the King’s charter,
grant, or patent, in the words in which it [was] to pass the Great Seal,
with the exceptions only of his Majesty’s style at the beginning and the
testing clause at the end . . . .85
This division in the drafting process, whereby testing clauses on charters were
attached in a process that was distinct from the composition of the charter’s
substance, counsels against reading the testing clauses of such charters as
organically integrated into the text of the charter. By contrast, the language of
the Constitution’s Attestation Clause was drafted, proposed, and approved at
the Constitutional Convention in a manner that did not distinguish it from
other clauses in the Constitution. In this sense, it was not attached via a routine
process that occurred out of the sight of the drafters. The Constitution was a
unique document drafted and approved by an ad hoc convention that did not
have established practices and divisions of labor upon which to fall back in the
same way that the King did with his Patent Office. Consequently, the drafting
process at the Constitutional Convention encourages us to read the

85.

terse that it seems misleading to consider its use as providing precedent that might have
guided the drafting of the relatively elaborate Attestation Clause found in the Constitution.
CHARLES DEANE, THE FORMS IN ISSUING LETTERS-PATENT BY THE CROWN OF ENGLAND:
WITH SOME REMARKS ON THE MASSACHUSETTS CHARTER OF THE 4TH OF MARCH, 1628-9, at
6 (Cambridge, Mass., John Wilson & Son 1870). The phrase “testing clause” generally was
used in Scottish law, while “attestation clause” was used to refer to the same clause in
English law. See BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER’S DICTIONARY OF LEGAL USAGE 93 (3d ed. 2011).
In the quoted passage, Deane ignores this distinction when he speaks of the “King’s Bill” as
having contained a “testing clause.”
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Constitution holistically, rather than by writing any of its language off as
boilerplate.
Even if one accepts the idea that the Attestation Clause was more than mere
boilerplate, however, it still is not immediately obvious that the references and
meanings embedded in this Clause are relevant to the work of modern-day
lawyers and scholars. Why should audiences today care about the ways these
legal formalities would have sounded two centuries ago? In what ways does a
historically informed view of the Attestation Clause offer lessons that might
contribute to the scholarly conversations of today?
This view of the Attestation Clause is relevant in part because it challenges
the idea that the Clause’s reference to the Declaration of Independence
constitutes an attempt to import the spirit and values of the Declaration into
the Constitution. As such, it presents some difficulties for lawyers and scholars
who wish to use this textual connection to the Declaration as a means of
infusing the Constitution with any values or meanings perceived to exist in the
Declaration of Independence.
In the past several decades, this importation-by-reference argument has
appeared most consistently amongst those who have argued that the
Constitution was designed to create a theistic, Christian nation.86 Those
looking to advocate a theistic vision of America inevitably must confront an
interpretive difficulty: the Constitution makes little direct reference to God, a
fact that sets it apart from many contemporaneous founding documents.
Daniel Dreisbach explained this interpretive problem in a 1996 article in the
Baylor Law Review, writing:
Given Christianity’s pervasive cultural and legal influence, which was
acknowledged by all in society, the architects of civil commonwealths
both before and after the Constitutional Convention deemed it
appropriate, indeed necessary, to recognize the God of the Bible in their
public documents. However, the delegates who met in Philadelphia and
crafted a new national charter, for whatever reasons, thought
differently. . . . [W]hy did the constitutional framers break with this
pious tradition?87
One response of scholars and lawyers who support a theistic interpretation of
the Constitution has been to argue that the Framers did not, in fact, break with

86.
87.

See, e.g., sources cited supra note 3.
Daniel L. Dreisbach, In Search of a Christian Commonwealth: An Examination of Selected
Nineteenth-Century Commentaries on References to God and the Christian Religion in the United
States Constitution, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 927, 964 (1996).
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the pious tradition at all. Rather, some commentators argue, the Framers wrote
a Declaration of Independence that explicitly speaks of “Nature’s God” and of a
“Creator [who endowed men] with certain unalienable Rights,”88 and then
they wrote a Constitution that incorporated the Declaration through the
reference in the Attestation Clause. So long as the Declaration and the
Constitution are viewed in tandem, these commentators suggest, the documents
present a Founding-era vision of America as a theistic nation. In the Attestation
Clause’s reference to the Declaration, these commentators see an argument in
support of such a tandem reading—which is to say, they see textual evidence of
an authorial intent to import the Creator of the Declaration into the fabric of
the Constitution.89
Justice Thomas advocated a similar—though certainly not identical—
argument in two separate pieces published shortly before his elevation to the
Supreme Court.90 Justice Thomas emphasized the Declaration as a document

88.
89.

90.

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1-2 (U.S. 1776).
As David Barton put it in a 2001 article in the Regent University Law Review:
The Framers . . . deliberately chose to incorporate into [our nation’s
founding] documents . . . the belief in theistic origins over that of non-theistic
origins.
....
. . . While [a contrary] conclusion is illogical, it is nevertheless defended by
asserting that the belief in a creator is incorporated into the Declaration of
Independence rather than the Constitution and that the Declaration of
Independence is a separate document from, and is not to affect the interpretation
of, the Constitution.
This argument is of recent origin, however, because well into the twentieth
century, the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution were viewed as
interdependent rather than as independent documents. In fact, the United States
Supreme Court declared, “[The Constitution] is but the body and the letter of
which the [Declaration of Independence] is the thought and the spirit, and it is
always safe to read the letter of the Constitution in the spirit of the Declaration of
Independence.”
No other conclusion logically can be reached since the Constitution directly
attaches itself to the Declaration of Independence in Article VII . . . .
Barton, supra note 3, at 312 (third and fourth alterations in original) (footnote omitted)
(quoting Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 160 (1897)). For another version
of this argument, see Jaffa, supra note 3, at 728-29.
Thomas, supra note 6, at 65 (“One should never lose sight of the fact that the last words of
the original Constitution as written refer to the Declaration of Independence, written just
eleven years earlier.”); Clarence Thomas, Toward a “Plain Reading” of the Constitution—The
Declaration of Independence in Constitutional Interpretation, 30 HOW. L.J. 983, 986-87 (1987)
(“Even a brief examination of the founding . . . provides ample evidence for [such an]
interpretation. . . . First, the Constitution makes explicit reference to the Declaration of
Independence in Article VII, stating that the Constitution is presented to the states for
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that grounds the nation’s political system in a “higher law background” that
can serve as a guide in the face of interpretive ambiguities.91 As one
commentator has put it, it is Justice Thomas’s view “that both a theory of
justice and the best defense of limited government stem from the natural law
principles embodied in the Declaration of Independence,”92 a document that
infuses our Constitution with the “moral underpinnings of classical
liberalism.”93 For Justice Thomas, therefore, the Attestation Clause’s allusion
to the Declaration is a conscious attempt by the Founders to establish a
connection between these two interdependent documents.
Once the Attestation Clause is seen in its historical context, however, these
arguments become less compelling. When viewed in light of the diplomatic
and legal practices that shaped the rhetoric of the Attestation Clause, that
Clause is revealed to be one that alludes to—and draws upon—a great variety
of legal and political documents. In so doing, the Clause acquires its own
distinctive message and spirit. To some degree, the Attestation Clause is
revealed to be a subtle advocate on behalf of continuity and legality, setting it
in partial contrast to the Declaration’s bold announcement of rupture with
England.94 This highlights an important fact about the Attestation Clause:

91.

92.
93.
94.

ratification by the Convention ‘the Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of our Lord
one-thousand seven-hundred and eighty-seven of the Independence of the United States of
America the Twelfth . . . .’”).
Thomas, supra note 6, at 63. Justice Thomas specifically explains that this “higher law
background” can aid interpretation by “giving body to open-ended constitutional
provisions.” Id. As Scott Gerber has noted, however, Justice Thomas distanced himself from
these views in his confirmation hearings. See SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, TO SECURE THESE
RIGHTS: THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 207
n.15 (1995).
Adam J. Hunt, The Liberal Justice Thomas: An Analysis of Justice Thomas’s Articulation and
Application of Classical Liberalism, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 557, 558 (2009).
Id. at 570.
Throughout this Note, I have contrasted the Attestation Clause’s signals of continuity with
the Declaration’s emphasis on political rupture and upheaval. It could be argued, however,
that I overstate this contrast insofar as I exclusively emphasize the Declaration’s radical
traits. As Jedediah Purdy has put it:
[The Declaration also contained] ideas that were deeply conservative. The bill of
particulars of the Declaration of Independence, the list of the king’s abuses, is as
traditional as the opening passages are radical. It draws insistently on precedent
from seventeenth-century English struggles between Parliament and the Crown.
Here, the Americans tied their vision of liberty to the personal rights and forms of
government that they inherited from earlier generations of Englishmen. Indeed,
even the colonists’ decision to ascribe their list of abuses to the king was willful
traditionalism: by the 1770s, most interference with colonial privileges came from
acts of Parliament, but the familiar language of constitutional complaint asserted
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through its many connections to historical texts and practices, the Clause
acquires a meaning that is more complex than any one of those particular
textual connections. When arguments focus exclusively on one of those
connections, they offer a vision of the Clause that, while not inaccurate, is
incomplete.
It should be noted that both the theistic argument and the higher-law
argument have been leveraged in support of views aligned with right-wing
politics in contemporary America, a fact that may seem to give the present
analysis of the Attestation Clause a political valence. Yet the lesson of the
Attestation Clause would apply regardless of political ideology; the critiques
espoused here would apply no less to lawyers or scholars who sought to use the
Attestation Clause to bring a liberal vision of the Declaration into the
Constitution. Regardless of the ideology one perceives in the Declaration, in
other words, the textual connection of the Attestation Clause ought not to be
made to carry the burden of importing that ideology into the Constitution, for
the textual evidence suggests that it was not designed simply to carry out this
task. Rather, it appears that the Clause was designed to carry its own
message—a message of reassurance, of continuity in a time of newfound
independence.
Of course, this does not mean that there is no place in the constitutional
canon for the Declaration of Independence. There are a variety of reasons why
one might think that the words of the Declaration are relevant to the task of
constitutional interpretation, and the Attestation Clause might have little to do
with many of these arguments. There is evidence that James Madison himself
thought the Declaration to be sufficiently relevant to the structure and
principles of American government to warrant its inclusion in his proposed

the rights of Englishmen against the prerogatives of the king, and the colonists
hewed to the custom.
Even when the Americans voiced their “wild” and “obscure” ideas of liberty,
then, they were not tradition-shattering fanatics. Instead, they were part of
English traditions of personal and political freedom, which had grown more
intense on the new continent. The Americans were creating a “sensation of
freedom,” a vision of personal liberty and political legitimacy, out of inherited
elements and new experience.
JEDEDIAH PURDY, A TOLERABLE ANARCHY: REBELS, REACTIONARIES, AND THE MAKING OF
AMERICAN FREEDOM 11-12 (2009). Even when one takes account of this important corrective
offered by Purdy, however, I believe that differences in emphasis stand out between the
Declaration and the Attestation Clause that make the contrast between these two meaningful
and significant.
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curriculum for law students at the University of Virginia.95 Many today might
draw a similar conclusion, and their reasons for so doing often will have little
to do with the Attestation Clause.
A good example of a scholar asserting alternative grounds for such a
connection is found in Scott Douglas Gerber’s 1995 book, To Secure These
Rights. Like Justice Thomas, Gerber argues that “the Constitution must be
interpreted in context. And . . . that context is the natural-rights political
philosophy of the American Revolution.”96 Unlike Justice Thomas, however,
Gerber does not invoke the Attestation Clause in order to argue that his theory
has specific textual support in the Constitution. Rather, Gerber attempts only
to use secondary historical documents to show that the Founders remained
committed to the natural-rights principles of the Declaration through 1787, as
well as to show that the Founders specifically wrote the Constitution in order
to implement these natural-rights principles. For Gerber, the Declaration is
helpful in that it provides a clear summary of “the Founders’ background
attitudes on the purpose of government,”97 and this summary is important
because “the particular provisions of the Constitution were written with the
Founders’ background attitudes in mind.”98
Gerber’s argument thus asserts a connection between the Declaration and
the Constitution that in no way relies upon the Attestation Clause. As such, any
study of the Attestation Clause has little to say to Gerber’s analysis. Yet
Gerber’s study is illuminative here, if only because it reveals the difficult
obstacles that face anyone advocating on behalf of the Declaration as a tool of
constitutional interpretation once the textual argument of the Attestation
Clause is removed. In the absence of this textual support, Gerber shows, the
argument becomes much more complex—it forces one to delve into difficult
questions of authorial intent and “background attitudes,” and it requires one to
show that secondary historical materials reveal these intentions and attitudes
with sufficient clarity to guide constitutional interpretation. Gerber’s work
received some harsh criticism for its inadequacy on these grounds99—and, in

95.

96.
97.
98.
99.

Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 8, 1825), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 218, 218-19 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910). For a discussion of Madison’s
proposed curriculum, see Dreisbach, supra note 87, at 969 n.193.
GERBER, supra note 91, at xiv.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 6-7.
As one book review rather scathingly put it, “Gerber’s argument is crippled by the
inadequacy of his historical scholarship and by his sometimes unrealistic view of the
American political system today.” Wendy Ann Semel, Book Note, Defender of the Natural
Rights Faith, 105 YALE L.J. 1427, 1428 (1996).

1268

“done in convention”

the process, it highlighted the fact that, in the absence of easy arguments about
the Attestation Clause, proving the legal connection between the Declaration
and the Constitution can be a daunting task.
An awareness of the distinctive spirit of the Attestation Clause does not, in
other words, definitively explain the relationship between the Declaration and
the Constitution. Rather, it highlights the fact that the relationship between
these two documents is more complex and fraught than many have made it out
to be. In illustrating this point, the foregoing study of the Attestation Clause
also highlights a broader interpretive point that has significance beyond any
specific debates about the relationship of the Declaration to the Constitution.
The broader point is this: when readers interpret a text, they often assimilate
impressive amounts of information in order to make meaning out of that text.
This information is not limited to the plain, denotative meanings of the words
on the page. It includes everything from the resonances a term or phrase has
with past usages, to the form and format in which those terms and phrases are
set. Such information often provides the reader with valuable interpretive cues.
Yet cues such as these are often the first aspects of a text to be left behind by
the passage of time. Particularly when dealing with a document as old as the
Constitution, there is a constant risk that these aspects will have receded into
history. The plain meaning of a document from the eighteenth century will
rarely be plain today, and a healthy dose of historical contextualization often is
needed to understand even the seemingly most straightforward and pro forma
aspects of the Constitution.
As I have attempted to show through the example of the Attestation
Clause, an appreciation of the subtle interpretive cues embedded in the
Constitution often can modify or enrich the seemingly obvious meaning of a
constitutional clause—and can sometimes undermine such a meaning. On a
theoretical level, the point is that nearly every word or phrase has a good deal
of history lurking behind it—and this is true even of text as seemingly dry as
the Attestation Clause. Particularly when dealing with a document as formally
innovative as the American Constitution, interpreters ignore this historical
backdrop at their peril—and, in the case of the Attestation Clause, to the legal
community’s detriment.
conclusion
As with many clauses of the Constitution, the Attestation Clause was to
some degree infused with the spirit and intent of a bold document committed
to the radical ideals of independence and popular sovereignty. However,
historical distance from the Founding has made us lose sight of the fact that the
Attestation Clause ultimately placed this radical document within a
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surprisingly traditional frame. In the eighteenth century, the Attestation Clause
would not have looked like a clause with a lone textual reference pointing
toward the Declaration of Independence. It would have looked alive with the
forms and practices of English and European diplomacy, as well as with the
emerging diplomatic practices of the Continental Congress. In this sense, the
fact that the constitutional text of the Attestation Clause suggests continuity
rather than rupture with the Articles of Confederation, as well as compatibility
with longstanding English diplomatic practices, provides an important
corrective to those who have focused exclusively upon the Attestation Clause as
a vehicle for importing the “spirit of the Declaration of Independence.” It
reminds us that the Founders were drawing on a variety of historical
documents and practices in order to send the newborn nation a complex set of
signals about the place of this Constitution—and, indeed, about the place of
this nation—in the world that preceded it. A reminder of the Declaration of
Independence, and of the national values embodied in that founding
document, was undoubtedly one part of this set of signals. Yet to read the
Attestation Clause as nothing more than a reference to the “spirit of the
Declaration of Independence” is to distort a Clause that appears to have had its
own distinct message, a message assuring a variety of audiences that the new
Constitution represented continuity and cooperation as well as revolution and
rebellion.
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